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1.1  Introduction 
In a world without money illusion a nominal  exchange rate deval- 
uation per se will not have any persistent real effects. Under various 
plausible  circumstances, however,  a devaluation may  speed up ad- 
justment of the real economy to disturbances, be they exogenous or 
policy  induced.  It is in this vein that a devaluation  is nearly always 
one of the major components of stabilization programs, such as those 
often administered by the International Monetary Fund. 
Until  quite recently  the consensus among economists was that a 
devaluation, if  it  had  any real  effects  at all, was expansionary: the 
resulting  increase in competitiveness would  switch  foreign and  do- 
mestic demand toward domestic goods. This switch, in the presence 
of idle factors of production, in  turn would  lead to an expansion in 
output, thus supporting one of the aims of stabilization policy (increas- 
ing output and, via output, employment). 
In  the  economic development  literature, early  doubts  were  ex- 
pressed  by  Hirschman  (1949) and, especially, Diaz-Alejandro (1963). 
Krugman and Taylor lucidly summarized and extended that strand of 
research in a well-known  paper (1978). All  these contributions point 
out various channels (distributional effects, the effects of initial fiscal 
or current account deficits, and real  balance  effects) through  which 
contractionary influences on aggregate demand may reverse the ex- 
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pansionary  effects of the expenditure switching  a devaluation  is in- 
tended to achieve. 
In this paper  I  first outline several mechanisms, substantially more 
likely  to be of importance in  less developed  countries (LDCs) than 
elsewhere, through which a devaluation  has a direct negative impact 
on aggregate supply. I then discuss the influence of a large foreign debt 
(obviously predominantly  an LDC problem),  first  on the effects  of 
discrete devaluation on output and then on the results to be expected 
from an anti-inflation policy used exclusively in  LDCs-the  exchange 
rate regime of a preannounced crawling peg. 
I do not address floating exchange rates because financial institutions 
in most LDCs are insufficiently developed to make that a viable policy 
option. Nor do  I discuss the interesting question of which “basket” to 
peg a country’s exchange rate to if that country has decided on some 
sort of a fixed rate; this question has already  been addressed in  the 
existing literature (see, for example, Branson and Katseli 1980). 
Section 1.2 presents a stylized model of a financial structure typical 
of many LDCs, one characterized by the absence of markets for pri- 
mary securities (such as  government bonds and equity), but flourishing 
curb markets. Bank credit and loans taken out on the curb market are 
used to finance firms’ working capital, not consumer expenditure. This 
model  provides  a  direct link  between  the financial  system and the 
aggregate supply side of the economy that will play an important role 
at various stages of the analysis that follows.’ Section 1.3 then employs 
variants of this model to illustrate several negative effects of a deval- 
uation on aggregate supply. I discuss, in turn, the role of intermediate 
imports, real wage indexation based on imported wage goods (namely, 
food), and the link between the real volume of bank credit and aggregate 
commodity supply forged by the financing of working capital require- 
ments. All three of these factors are shown to create working capital 
requirements. All three of these factors are shown to create a channel 
through which a nominal devaluation has a direct contractionary effect 
on aggregate supply, as opposed to the Diaz-Alejandro and the Krug- 
man and Taylor contractionary effects on aggregate demand. This paper 
should therefore be seen as  a complement to the work of those authors.2 
It should be noted that a fall in output induced by a backward shift in 
the aggregate supply schedule will be accompanied by upward pressure 
on inflation, contrary to a demand-induced contraction a la Diaz-Ale- 
jandro and Krugman and Taylor. It will therefore jeopardize the real 
depreciation a nominal devaluation is intended to  achieve, also contrary 
to a demand-induced contraction. 
Section  1.4 introduces private foreign borrowing and illustrates the 
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devaluation and on the effects of a preannounced crawling-peg regime. 
Finally, section  I .5  provides a summary and conclusions. 
1.2  The Basic Model 
The model presented below is similar, though not identical, to the 
one used in van Wijnbergen  (1983a); I  will  therefore describe it only 
briefly here. The reader interested in more detail than is provided here 
should consult that paper. 
The model presented here incorporates several  stylized character- 
istics of the financial structure of many LDCs.  I  assume the absence 
of markets for government bonds or equity. Intermediation  between 
firms  and  private  wealth  holders  takes place  in  the official  banking 
system and in the unofficial  money market  (UMM), or curb market. 
Thus, firms finance fixed and working capital requirements by  bank 
loans, by loans taken out at the UMM, or by retained earnings. Since 
firm owners can (and do) lend on the UMM, the opportunity cost of 
using retained earnings is the UMM rate. In fact, the use of retained 
earnings is modeled here as a loan from the owners of  the firm to the 
firm and is lumped together with UMM loans. 
Commercial banks are assumed not to hold free reserves. Reserve 
requirements  and credit ceilings are thus mutually  dependent instru- 
ments. The model assumes the use of credit ceilings.  For simplicity, 
their  sources of  funds  consist of  demand deposits only.  Although  a 
more sophisticated liability structure can easily be constructed,  it would 
add unneccessary detail to the model. 
The private sector allocates its wealth, W (equal to the real value of 
the monetary  base, MR, plus the capital  stock) over loans made  to 
firms through the UMM, deposits in banks, and cash. The model further 
assumes a fixed deposit  rate and a fixed cash-bank deposit  ration  in 
private portfolios. 
If  a Tobin-type  asset model  is defined to govern  the allocation of 
wealth or  the UMM and other financial assets, a private supply of loans 
on the UMM, B,,  is created, such that: 
(1)  B, =  [I - in([,  y)]W, 
where B, and Ware real variables expressed in terms of domestic goods 
(nominal quantities are deflated by the price of domestic goods, p);  and 
y  is the real output of domestic goods. Since the private sector does 
not directly hold foreign assets, foreign interest rates and the expected 
rate of  depreciation, 8,  do not appear in equation (1  1. 
Firms demand loans for working capital, D,  to finance the variable 
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the sake of brevity. D depends positively on the real product wage (in 
terms of domestic goods), w;  on the real price of imported oil, po = 
-  epb ,  where p; is the “dollar price”  of oil and e the exchange rate 
P 
(“pesos per dollar”); and on domestic output, y, such that : 
(2)  D  = D(w,  Po,Y),  Dw,  Dpo,  D, ’  0. 
Firms will, of course, first try to satisfy their need for funds from official 
banks, since lending rates are invariably far below UMM rates, with 
loan quantities rationed as a consequence. Firms’ net demand for loans 
at the curb market is therefore D + K -  Bb, where K is the real value 
of  the capital stock and Bb is the real volume of  bank credit (deflated 
by p). This leads to an equilibrium condition for the UMM: 
In what follows,  K  is suppressed for notational  convenience; I will 
discuss only short-run phenomena, and so will ignore changes in the 
capital stock. By manipulating various budget constraints, it is straight- 
forward to show that equation (3) also implies money market equilib- 
rium.  Equation (3) can be represented  in  i - y  space, or the asset 
market equilibrium locus, AM,  in figure 1.1. 
Y 
Fig. 1.1  Asset and goods market loci. 21  Exchange Rate Management and Stabilization Policies 
Along AM, equation (4) (presented below) holds that: 
Because AM slopes upward (mi  <  O!); higher income, y, will increase 
private money demand, (my  > O), and therefore reduce the private 
supply of loans at the UMM; and at the same time, the demand for 
loans to finance working capital rises (0,  > 0). The resulting excess 
demand for funds necessitates an increase in  the UMM rate, so that 
AM slopes upward. 
Consider now the real part of  the model. Production technology is 
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas in capital, on the one hand, and labor 
and energy, on the other. This allows us to write variable costs (which 
need to be financed by working capital) as: 
D = g(w,  Po)  yaP-l), 
where a  =  1/(1 - a),  where  cx  is a Cobb-Douglas share parameter. 
Total variable costs and inclusive costs of  credit are accordingly LC 
= D (1  + i -  a).  Firms maximize profits, p(y -  LO,  which leads to 
an aggregate supply function: 
(4) 
where terms involving K are suppressed. 
Aggregate demand for domestic goods, Ad, consists of foreign de- 
mand, E(q),  with q = p/(ep*);  the relative price of domestic final goods 
in terms of foreign final goods and domestic consumption demand for 
domestic goods, C, (q,  i -  B, y -  p,O  -  BMR, W); investment, Z(i 
- 6, w, po); and government expenditure, G, such that: 
1  = ayQ-1  g(w7 Po)  (1  + i -  01, 
Ad=Cd+z+E+  G. 
Disposable income equals output minus oil imports, poO, minus capital 
losses on nominal assets, fiMR (equal to fiMR rather than  C&I.MR 
because income and MR are expressed in terms of  domestic goods). 
Finally, the price level is assumed to be sticky, and relative prices 
to change only gradually over time. The inflation rate, however, can 
change instantaneously in response to anticipated foreign inflation; 0'; 
to the expected rate of devaluation, 8; or to excess demand for domestic 
goods, such that: 
6 = 8 + 0* + h (Ad -  y). 
A microeconomic rationale for equations like (5) is presented in Barro 
(1972) and Sheshinsky and Weiss (1977). Gradual price adjustment im- 
plies the possibility of disequilibrium in the goods market. I will assume 
throughout that the country in question is under a regime of classical 22  Sweder van Wijnbergen 
unemployment (that is, we start out in  a position where $ > 8  + 0'). 
This implies that  output will  be  determined by  supply.  I  make  this 
assumption because most of  the discussion to follow focuses on ag- 
gregate  supply effects,  which lose much of  their relevance under a 
Keynesian regime. At any rate, the case of  Keynesian unemployment 
has been more than adequately treated in Krugman and Taylor (1978). 
The assumption of classical unemployment implies that output will 
be determined by the aggregate supply function in equation (4). Sub- 
stitutingo from equation (5)  in equation (4)  yields a goods market locus 
of GM in figure 1.1, such that: 
The denominator is always positive. The numerator will also be positive 
if  1 + A (Cd,,MR  + 11)  > 0,  but this is not necessarily so, since Z, < 0. 
The term plays a crucial role in the stability analysis of Keynes-Wicksell 
growth models, which have similar price dynamics (see Fischer 1972). 
If  the term is positive, those models will have stable dynamics. An 
intuitive interpretation of the term is given and discussed in Fischer 
(1972) and in  van  Wijnbergen (1983a); I follow these two papers  in 
assuming the term is positive. That assumption implies that -  < 
0, since there is a minus sign in front of the whole expression; GM 
slopes downward in figure 1.1. The reason for this is simple: higher pro- 
duction, y, will, other things equal, lead to a lowerd in equation (5)  be- 
cause it leads to excess supply. Unless the interest rate, i, falls, the real 
rate will go up, which, from equation (4), can be seen to be incompatible 
with a higher y. In other words, higher output will, all else equal, lead 
to less inflation. Since the aggregate supply schedule tells us that the 
real interest rate i -  fi will have to fall before firms will increase output, 
given other factor costs, it follows that nominal rates of i will have to 
fall even lower than inflation, o, or GM slopes downward. 
ii  1 GM 
1.3  The Contractionary Effects of a Discrete Devaluation on 
Aggregate Supply 
In this section I will discuss three channels through which a deval- 
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termediate imports, real wage indexation based on a commodity bundle 
including foreign goods, and the real volume of bank credit available 
to the business  sector,  For the  sake of  clarity,  I will  address each 
channel in turn using slight variants of the model. In reality, of course, 
all three mechanisms  work  simultaneously  in  the economies of  the 
countries in question. 
1.3.1  Intermediate Imports 
Let us consider the  short-run impact  of  a devaluation within the 
context of the model outlined in the previous section. To simplify the 
analysis, assume that nominal wages are indexed on the price of do- 
mestic goods. This assumption will allow us to defer discussion of the 
role of wage indexation to the next subsection, where we will examine 
proper indexation on the consumer price index (CPI). 
Under that assumption a devaluation will disturb two variables. The 
relative price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods, q, will fall 
(and competitiveness increase); and the real price of oil in terms of 
domestic goods will rise, such that: 
(6)  %  = &>O,and-  dq = -  -<O.  4 
de  P  de  e 
The effects of these disturbances can be seen in figure 1.2. The AM 
curve is not affected by q but does shift because of  the devaluation- 
induced increase in po: higher oil prices raise variable costs and there- 
fore working capital requirements. This will, for given output levels, 
lead to more demand on the UMM and thus to higher interest rates, 
and the AM curve shifts upward (as shown in the figure), such that: 
(7) 
The effects on the GM curve are more complicated. Consider first 
the effect of the change in po, the “structuralist”  channel. Higher oil 
prices will directly reduce aggregate supply because they constitute an 
increase in  the price of a factor of  production. Added to that are de- 
flationary effects on demand brought about by reduced investment and 




Fig. 1.2  The effects of  devaluation through its impact on po and q. 
where +o is the share of intermediate imports in variable costs. We 
made the plausible  assumption that the short-run price  elasticity  of 
energy demand is less than one (1 -  E&,  > 0). Accordingly, the GM 
curve shifts downward, leading to a new short-run equilibrium at point 
B. At B, output has fallen but the curb market rate could go up or down 
(in figure 1.2 it falls); higher working capital requirements push  i up 
but lower income pulls it down. The contractionary effect on output 
is unambiguous, however. 
Of course, this is not the end of the story. There is still the standard 
expenditure-switching effect via dqlde < 0. A lower 4 switches world 
demand to the domestic goods, which in turn shifts the GM curve back 
up, such that: 
(9) 
I  Y=Y 
This corresponds to an upward shift after a devaluation, since dqlde 
=  -q/e < 0 as well. 
Accordingly, we arrive at a point such as C in figure 1.2, with higher 
output  and  interest  rates  than  would  have  resulted  without  the 
expenditure-switching effect. Without intermediate imports, AM would 25  Exchange Rate Management and Stabilization Policies 
have stayed put and GM would have shifted upward because of  ex- 
penditure switching, and an equilibrium such as point D in the figure 
would have resulted. It is straightforward to show that yc < yo: 
(1;  +)  (11;  -1 
Point D corresponds to the first term  in equation (lo), the positive 
expenditure switching effect.  Point C  results from adding the struc- 
turalist effect via intermediate inputs (term I1 in equation [lo], which 
is always contractionary. Thus, yc <  y,. 
In summary, if  the prices of final goods adjust only gradually (that 
is, they cannot “jump”), a devaluation raises the real price of imported 
inputs in terms of domestic final goods. This result adds a contrac- 
tionary element to a devaluation. Because intermediate goods typically 
make up the bulk of most LDC imports (50 to 60 percent is not an 
unreasonable estimate), the contractionary effect is likely to be more 
important in LDCs than in developed countries,the bulk of whose im- 
ports are typically consumer goods. 
1.3.2  Real Wage Indexation 
The second contractionary channel, real wage indexation, is in some 
sense a counterpart  of  the increase in competitiveness a  successful 
devalation also needs to achieve. Consider again the basic model of 
section 1.2, with two changes. For a clearer focus I will ignore inter- 
mediate imports from now on; they have already been discussed in the 
previous section. The second change is the assumption of  real wage 
indexation on the CPI, enforced by formal contracts, implicit arrange- 
ments, or social pressure. This change introduces a negative relation- 
ship between the real domestic product wage, w,  and the terms of trade, 
q, such that: 
w = 4-7  (1  1) 
where y equals the share of  foreign imports (food) in wage earners’ 
consumption basket. 
Furthermore, under the classical unemployment assumption of the 
model, real product-wage increases reduce output through two different 
channels. First, a higher w increases the demand for working capital 
(some of  which is needed  to finance wage payments), which in turn 
results in an upward shift of the AM curve, such that: 
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Second, a higher w also raises labor costs and therefore reduces ag- 
gregate supply, and the GM curve shifts to the left, such that: 
AZ,  -  [I + h(Cd,,  MR + ZJ]  +L  (1 +  i -  @)/w 
0,  -  - 
A  (1 - Cd,,) + [l + A(Cd,, MR + ZI)] 
GM  .. 
I=I 
where  +L  is the labor share in variable costs. The net result can be 
seen in figure 1.3: output will fall unambiguously. This, combined with 
the negative  link between the terms of  trade, q, and  w  because  of 
indexation, is what causes problems after a devaluation that succeeds 
in lowering q (increasing competitiveness). Higher competitiveness im- 
plies that foreign goods are more expensive in terms of domestic goods. 
This is compatible with an unchanged real consumption wage only if 
real domestic product wages rise, which adds an aggregate supply shock 
effect to a devaluation, such that: 
Fig. 1.3 
_-  dY  - 2.  +I+ 
de  dq  de 
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1.3.3  The Real Volume of Bank Credit 
The final contractionary  influence on aggregate supply is the real 
volume of bank credit, which is an important determinant of aggregate 
supply because of working capital requirements. Of course, given the 
sticky price-level assumptions made  so far, this influence will come 
into play only gradually. Rather than engage in a full-fledged dynamic 
analy~is,~  I once again will slightly modify the model to eliminate the 
contractionary effects already discussed and focus on the contraction- 
ary effects of a decrease in the real volume of bank credit. 
In particular, I will assume that through indexing arrangements the 
devaluation is passed on one-for-one in domestic prices and wages, 
thereby leaving q and w unaffected. This leads to a discrete change in 
p,  of a proportion equal to the percentage increase in e. That in turn 
implies a reduction in B, and MR, the real volume of bank credit and 
the monetary base. The contractionary effects of a lower real monetary 
base are, of course, well known and will, through standard monetary 
channels, be counteracted over time by a current account surplus. 
Let us now consider the effects of a devaluation-induced reduction 
in the real volume of bank credit. There is no direct effect on the GM 
curve, since the real interest rate is the link between the financial system 
and the real part of the model, as shown in figure 1.4. The AM curve, 
however,  is affected. A lower BP means less  bank  credit for firms, 
which are therefore forced to rely more on the curb market for funds. 
This causes an incipient excess demand. To  return to financial sector 
equilibrium, the interest rate on the curb market will have to rise, and 
the AM curve shifts up (as shown in the figure), such that: 
Since we are discussing a decline in B,, equation (1 3) implies an upward 
shift in AM. 
The net effect of dB,lde  < 0 on output y  is negative, as can be seen 
in figure 1.4. The cut in Bp  pushes up the interest rate for a given rate 
of inflation, which raises the real rate that will reduce not only aggregate 
demand  through  traditional  mechanisms, but  also  aggregate  supply 
through the resulting higher cost of working capital. Whether inflation 
accelerates or declines depends on whether the aggregate supply effect 
via the costs of working capital dominates the additional effects re- 
ducing aggregate demand, such that: 
-  50.  (14)  -  -  do  Z,(a - 1) (1 + i -  @)/y - h (1 - Cd) 
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Fig. 1.4  The effects of  a devaluation-induced  reduction  in the  real 
volume of bank credit, Bp. 
If fi rises it will do so less than i does, however, so that the real rate 
i -  fi increases and, from the aggregate supply equation (4), y falls. 
For a more extensive discussion of the effects of changes in bank credit 
on inflation and output, see van Wijnbergen (1983a). 
Empirical evidence for Argentina (Cavallo 1977) and South Korea 
(van Wijnbergen 1982) strongly supports the initial (say, two-quarters) 
dominance of the aggregate supply effect on inflation. That raises the 
intriguing possibility that inflation might accelerate on top of the one- 
for-one pass-through of  the devaluation in the price level already in- 
corporated, leading to the possibility of at least an initial, gradual, real 
appreciation after a nominal devaluation! Of  course, standard defla- 
tionary effects on aggregate demand caused by a lower real monetary 
base will make this less likely to happen. Whether it will or not is an 
empirical issue, but the theoretical possibility is there in a stable model 
without money illusion. 
1.4  Foreign Debt, Devaluation, and the Crawling Peg 
In this section I will  discuss another issue complicating exchange 
rate policy: the existence of  a substantial foreign debt, bringing with 
it a debt service burden. This issue is substantially more important in 
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it is in developed countries. To examine foreign borrowing, I first mod- 
ify the simplest version of the model, that in section 1.2, by removing 
intermediate imports. I also make the no-immediate-pass-through as- 
sumption used in  sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2. Given this modified model 
I will then briefly discuss the effect of foreign debt on the impact of a 
devaluation. Finally, I will describe the consequences of foreign debt 
on an interesting policy experiment recently tried, without much suc- 
cess, in several Latin American countries: an attempt to curb inflation 
by  a preannounced slowdown in the rate of depreciation of the ex- 
change rate. 
1.4.1  Foreign Debt Introduced 
The bulk of private foreign debt in LDCs consists of  the liabilities 
of commercial firms. That debt is moreover almost exclusively Euro- 
dollar debt, since Western bond markets are by and large closed to 
LDCs. Thus, contrary  to most previous research,  I  will  not model 
capital mobility as foreign investors buying domestic bonds, or vice 
versa; this is not the way capital flows in and out of LDCs. Instead, I 
will assume that foreign borrowing is done by firms. Exchange risk is 
always borne by the borrower, and the borrower pays the foreign in- 
terest rate, i'. The cost of  a foreign loan is, accordingly, i'  + 8, with 
8 the  expected  (and  actual, in  this  perfect-foresight  model) rate of 
devaluation. Substitution between foreign and domestic sources of funds 
is assumed to be imperfect: the larger the interest differential, i - i' 
- 8,  the higher the (stock) demand for foreign loans by firms, B,(= 
e B;/p), where B;  is the dollar value of the debt, or: 
Bf = eB;  (i -  i*  - 8)/p,  B;'  > 0. 
Dependence on y  is easily introduced but adds only uninformative al- 
gebra. I will use B;  for eB;'/p throughout, for notational convenience. 
Introducing foreign borrowing as a third source of  funds for firms 
modifies the financial sector equilibrium condition, equation (3), which 
now becomes: 
(16) 
Note that firms may take out foreign loans, but private wealth holders 
still do not hold foreign assets. The terms  i'  and 8 therefore do not 
appear as arguments of m( ). This assumption about portfolio structure 
is realistic for all but a few LDCs. Furthermore, MR  is redefined to be 
equal to the real value of the monetary base minus private foreign debt: 
MR = MBIP -  By  Since capital inflows cannot be sterilized (by as- 
sumption), MR in the new definition is fixed at any given time, since 
increases in Bf lead to one-for-one increases in MIB. 
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The only change needed in the real part of the model is in the defi- 
nition  of disposable  income (an argument  of  cd, domestic consumer 
demand for home  goods). Disposable  income  now  incorporates not 
only capital losses, pMR, but also interest payments abroad and an- 
ticipated capital losses on foreign debt due to depreciation, such that: 
(17)  ~d  = Y -  PMR -  (i'  + O)B,. 
The diagrammatic apparatus of figure  1.  I  remain intact, although the 
algebraic expressions for slopes and shifts change somewhat (see the 
appendix). 
I .4.2 
A discrete devaluation in the presence of foreign debt raises a tech- 
nical  problem  in the continuous time-instantaneous  loans framework 
used here. Of course, de > 0 does not increase the amount of liquidity 
provided by existing debt; but the exchange rate at which the debt was 
contracted, say, e-,  is relevant where e- is the old rate prevailing just 
before the devaluation. Accordingly, the AM curve is not affected, as 
shown in figure 1.5. 
Foreign Debt and Devaluation 
(1;  -1  (11;  +) 
The first term, I, gives the contractionary effect of the debt service 
burden  and is negati~e;~  this is the shift indicated in  figure  1.5. The 
second term, 11,  represents the standard expenditure-switching effect 
via the terms of trade, which was discussed in section  1.3.1. 
The  net  effect  on  output  is  ambiguous,  of  course,  since  the 
expenditure-switching effect is expansionary,  but the debt service  effect 
adds a contractionary channel: 
dY 
-  = (mB;'/e - m,MR)  (-XA,,,q/e  + AC<,,(i' + O)BT/p). 
de 
(X; +I  (Y; -1 
Because it operates on aggregate demand, this contractionary channel 
is more in  the Krugman and Taylor vein than the three channels ana- 
lyzed in  section  1.3. 
1.4.3 
In the late 1970s several Latin American countries tried out an in- 
novative policy to bring down inflation: a preannounced slowdown in 
the rate of devaluing the nominal  exchange rate. (For an interesting 
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Fig. 1.5  The effects of  a devaluation-induced  increase in  the debt 
service burden. 
discussion of  the overall results, see Diaz-Alejandro 1981  .) One of the 
more puzzling outgrowths of these experiments was the huge real ap- 
preciation (around 40 percent in one year in Argentina, for example) 
that  resulted  from the persistence of domestic inflation  at a rate far 
above foreign inflation plus the rate of crawl. In fact, domestic inflation 
in  Argentina actually accelerated in the first few months after its new 
policy went into effect. 
There is now an extensive literature on this subject (see, for example, 
Calvo 1981; Obstfeld 1984; or Taylor 1981). The stories are essentially 
similar: the slowdown in the rate of  crawl causes an incipient excess 
demand for domestic assets, which  in  turn causes an initial  real  ap- 
preciation  that will  disappear gradually as balance-of-payments  sur- 
pluses augment the domestic money stock. The Argentine puzzle re- 
mains, however. Why was there an initial acceleration of the inflation 
rate, rather than less than one-for-one slowdown that would also cause 
a real appreciation? The following discussion will  show that the exis- 
tence of  a large foreign debt may  be the clue to solving the puzzle, 
since a lower rate of crawl reduces the debt service burden  for any 
given volume of debt and so provides an expansionary stimulus. 
Consider,  then, what  an announced (and, a  nontrivial  restriction, 
believed) slowdown of the rate of devaluation, 8, does in  the context 
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that things would go as they were expected to go, that is, that inflation 
and the rate of interest would fall one-for-one with the slowdown in 8. 
Would this be a sustainable equilibrium, with an unchanged real interest 
rate and inflation down to the new value of 6'  + 0? As we will see, 
this clearly would not. 
Regarding the asset markets, the experiment would leave the interest 
differential, i -  i'  -  8, unchanged, so that Bf would remain unchanged. 
But at the lower interest rate, money velocity would fall; the private 
sector would increase its demand for domestic money; and therefore, 
as a consequence of the wealth constraint, the private  sector would 
cut back on its supply of funds on the unregulated market. As a result, 
the interest rate would go back up, widening the gap i -  i' -  8, making 
it more attractive for firms to borrow abroad, and thus leading to an 
inflow of foreign capital. The incipient excess demand for money would 
therefore be met partly by higher domestic interest rates (which reduce 
money demand) and partly by an inflow of foreign capital, which in- 
creases the money  supply (if  at least the inflow is not  sterilized, a 
realistic assumption in LDCs). The net effect is that the AM curve will 
shift down after a reduction in 8, but less than one-for-one, such that: 
miMR 
mi  MR - mBj 
=E,O<E<l.  (20) 
Note that we are reducing 0, and so a positive sign on expression (20) 
corresponds to a downward shift of the AM curve, as shown in figure 
1.6. This part of the story is essentially  similar to the analyses per- 
formed in Calvo (1981), Obstfeld (1981; 1984), Taylor (1983), and other 
papers in this volume. 
But consider now what happens in the real part of the model. If our 
hypothetical experiment is followed again, i and  would decrease one- 
for-one with 8, and i -  0 would remain unchanged, as would real output. 
This case corresponds to a downward shift of GM one-for-one with the 
reduction in 8 (note that i is on the vertical axis, so that dimensions are 
commensurate). At a lower inflation rate and rate of crawl, however, 
capital losses on the monetary base, MR, and the debt service burden, 
(i' + 0) Bf, would have decreased, which, other things equal, implies an 
increase in disposable income. That increase would put upward pres- 
sure on aggregate demand and shift the GM  curve back up, so that this 
curve too would shift down less than one-for-one with 8. It is even pos- 
sible that the GM curve would shift up rather than down, such that: 
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Fig. 1.6  The effects of a reduction in the rate of crawl, d9 <  0, where 
both curves shift down less than do. 
where h = 1  + h(cdy[MR  + (i' + 8)B;l  + Cdw B;) > 0. The second 
term is less than one, so 1 -  XCdyMR/h  >  0; but if Bfis large enough the 
whole expression could turn negative, leading to an upward rather than 
a downward shift (keep in mind we are discussing a reduction in 8). 
The appendix shows that what figure 1.6 suggests is indeed the case: 
interest rates will fall, but less than one-for-one with 8, leading to an 
increase in i -  i'  -  0 and a capital inflow. The most interesting results, 
however, are those for the inflation response. There are two reasons 
why, if  it falls, it will fall less than one-for-one with 8, causing a real 
appreciation to develop over time. 
First, consider what would happen if the inflation response fell one- 
for-one. Since, as we have seen, i will not fall all the way, the real rate, 
i - 8,  would rise. This increase would lead to higher costs of working 
capital and therefore to a cut in aggregate supply, which in turn would 
push the inflation rate up. (The higher real rate would also cut demand. 
There is strong empirical evidence, however, that working capital ef- 
fects on the supply side dominate in the short run. See Cavallo 1977; 
van Wijnbergen 1982.) 
The second reason why inflation will not decrease one-for-one is the 
increase in disposable income due to the lower debt service on foreign 
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debt is large enough, the  reduction  in  debt  service may  become  so 
large, and the resulting demand expansion so big, that inflation will 
accelerate after the slowdown in  8.  The debt service element is what 
distinguishes this discussion from the existing literature on the crawling 
peg, in which such an acceleration of inflation cannot occur. 
1.5  Conclusions 
This paper examined a variety of problems complicating exchange 
rate management and, especially, the use of  the exchange rate as an 
instrument of stabilization policy in less developed countries. The first 
part of the paper outlined three channels through which a devaluation 
has a direct contractionary impact on the aggregate supply side of the 
economy: the domestic currency costs of intermediate imports; wage 
indexing (in the form of  explicit contracts, implicit arrangements, or 
social pressure) with foreign goods present in wage earners’ consump- 
tion bundles (namely, food imports); and a reduced volume of real credit 
to firms. The last channel has  its impact  on the supply  side of  the 
economy because firms in need of funds to finance working capital are 
pushed into the curb market if  bank  credit  is reduced; as a result, 
interest rates increase and the aggregate supply curve shifts back. This 
last contractionary effect is obviously exacerbated if  the devaluation 
is accompanied by a cut in the nominal volume of  bank credit, as is 
often the case. 
There is by now an extensive literature on contractionary devalua- 
tion, aptly summarized and extended by Krugman and Taylor (1978). 
They, as do most authors, focus on contractionary effects on aggregate 
demand (and, via Keynesian multiplier effects, only indirectly on ag- 
gregate supply). Both types of effects-the  Krugman-Taylor demand 
contractions and the backward  shifts in  the aggregate supply curve 
described here-are  deplorable, of course, since no country wants to 
incur unnecessarily  the social costs of  lost output and employment. 
Nonetheless, the contractionary effects of a devaluation on the supply 
side are more damaging than those on aggregate demand because a cut 
in aggregate supply leads to upward pressure on inflation, while a cut 
in aggregate demand tends to lower inflation. Over time, upward pres- 
sure on inflation may threaten the increase in competitiveness a nominal 
devaluation is usually also intended to achieve. 
The second part of the paper discussed a second issue complicating 
exchange rate  management  in  LDCs:  the presence  of  a  substantial 
foreign debt. It was demonstrated  that if  a devaluation succeeds in 
increasing competitiveness, it  will also temporarily raise the real (in 
terms of domestic goods) burden of servicing that foreign debt, causing 
a Krugman-Taylor-like contractionary effect on aggregate demand. 
The paper then proceeded to analyze the effects of a preannounced 
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dence in previous  work that interest rates and inflation will fall less 
than one-for-one with a slowdown in the rate of crawl, if at all, so that 
a real appreciation  will emerge. The new point in this analysis is the 
demonstration that the existence of a substantial foreign debt (leading 
to a substantial decline in capital losses on foreign debt if the rate of 
devaluation falls) may lead to such an expansionary effect on aggregate 
demand that inflation  actually accelerates in the early phases of the 
program. This is more than a theoretical cunosum; it is exactly what 
happened in the first few months after Argentina experimented with a 
slowdown in the rate of devaluation. 
All of  this does not imply that a devaluation  should never be con- 
sidered. It does suggest, however, that a devaluation is likely to be an 
ineffective tool for demand management because it may cut aggregate 
supply  to an equal if  not  greater extent in  the  short run. Another 
conclusion suggested by the analysis is that if a devaluation is used to 
increase competitiveness by changing relative prices (to speed up ad- 
justment to more fundamental reforms), special attention should be 
paid to compensate for the negative effects on aggregated supply, since 
these, contrary to the negative effects on aggregate demand, will ex- 
acerbate inflationary pressures that could well threaten any real de- 
preciation that nominal devaluation might achieve initially. 
Appendix 
1.The model of section 1.2, without foreign borrowing in differen- 
tiated form, is as follows. If equation (4)  is used to substitute out @ 
d@ = di  + (a - 1)(1 +  i -  @)  , differentiation of the resulting  [  Y 
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The expression A in equation (14)  is the Jacobian of the system A.l: 
A  = (0,  + m, MR)(l + A  C,,MR)  - mi W(h(1 - C,) 
+ (1 + h(C,MR  + ZI)  [(a - l)/yl(l + i -  0). 
2. The model of  section 1.2, without intermediate imports but with 
foreign borrowing, (as outlined in section 1.4) is as follows. 
0,  + my  MR 
A(1 - C,) 
+ (a - 1)(1  + i -  0) 
m,MR - mBj 
1  + A(C,  (MR + (i*  + 0)B) r) 
+ C,,,B; 
-  mB@0 
(1  + A  Cdy(i*  + 0) Bj + ACdw Bj  A.2 
(1 + A(Cd,MR  + ZI) 
1 
= [  - AC&lf)d0  ( 
The Jacobian of A.2, Al,  equals: 
Al = (0,  + m,MR)(l  + ACdy(MR + (i*  + 0)B; - (mi  MR - mB;) 
(A(1 - C,)  + (a - 1)  (1 + i - 0)[1  + X(C,MR  + 01) > 0. 
After some algebra is performed, the assertions in the text can easily 
be seen to be true: 
di 
--  1 = (-(D,  + m,MR)  ACdy(Bf + MR) + m,MR(X(l - C,) 
d0 
+ (a - 1)(1 + i - 0)(1  + X(C,MR  + Il))))/Al  < 0. 
--  do  1  = (mi  MR(A(1 - C,)  + (a - 1)(1 + i -  0) 
d0 
(I, - AC,(i*  + 0)B; - AC&lj) 
(A) 
(1 + i -  @))AC,  -  (0,  + my  MR + mB;  ~ (a - 1) 
Y 




The term A corresponds to the first reason for -  < 1 given in the 
text and is indeed negative if  the aggregate supply effects of real in- 
terests rates via  the cost  of  working capital (the “Cavallo  effect”) 
dominate the aggregate demand effects of higher real rates. 
The  term  B  corresDonds  to the  second  reason  discussed  there. 
($ - l), ($ - I) < 0 corresponds  to the claim in  the text that 
both interest rates and inflation will fall less than one-for-one with a 
reduction in 0 (if at all). 37  Exchange Rate Management and Stabilization Policies 
Notes 
1.  This link has been discussed extensively in recent work on the stagflationary effects 
of restrictive monetary policy in LDCs (Cavallo 1977; Bruno 1979; van Wijnbergenl982, 
1983a, 1983b; Taylor 1981; and Buffie 1984). 
2.  The first contractionary effect on aggregate supply (via intermediate imports) has 
been formalized before by van Wijnbergen  (1980), Buffie (1983), Gylfason and Schmid 
(1984), and Gylfason and Risager  (1984). The other two effects, although  frequently 
brought  up in policy-making  circles in LDCs, have not  yet found their  way  into the 
theoretical  literature, as far as I know. Cardoso (1981) presented related work but did 
not derive the contractionary effects on aggregate supply presented  here. 
3.  The dynamics of a similar model are analyzed, albeit in a different context, in van 
Wijnbergen (1983a; 1983b). 
4.  This is assuming the real rate on foreign loans (i' + 8 -  p)  is positive, which may 
fail to hold true during a strong real appreciation  (.@  > 8  + p'). 
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217-21. 
Comment  James A. Hanson 
For some time the international  finance literature has included  argu- 
ments that devaluation may reduce aggregate demand and output, de- 
pending on the sizes of  appropriately defined  price elasticities  of de- 
mand for exports and imports. Recently, a new strand of literature on 
contractionary devaluations has argued that  devaluation reduces ag- 
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gregate  supply by  increasing the cost of  imported  inputs, including 
inputs consumed by domestic factors of  production. The output effect 
of  a  devaluation  thus  depends  on  the  algebraic  sum  of  the  usual 
expenditure-switching and expenditure-reducing effects, plus any sup- 
pl y-reducing effects. 
In addition to examining these supply-reducing effects, the model 
used  in  van Wijnbergen’s  paper permits discussion of  the effects of 
devaluation on the financial side of the economy and their links to the 
real economy, through both the demand side and the supply side. In 
the model, devaluation cuts real wealth and the real supply of credit. 
As a result, output tends to decline because of both the traditional real 
balance effect (the demand side) and the higher real cost of credit (the 
supply side). 
According  to the paper, one implication  of the negative effect of 
devaluation  on aggregate supply is that prices  may  increase  propor- 
tionately more than a devaluation. The recent Argentine and Korean 
devaluations are cited as evidence of  this possibility, but here I would 
argue that some care is needed  in  the interpretation. In many cases 
devaluations  are accompanied by  a substantial  adjustment of public 
sector prices  and controlled  prices, which  could  easily  result  in  the 
price index increasing faster than a devaluation, but not because of it. 
In fact, most empirical studies suggest that devaluation typically does 
result in a depreciation of the real exchange rate for at least one or two 
years; that is, the total price rise over that period does not fully offset 
the devaluation.  Of  course, immediately after a devaluation, prices 
typically do increase faster than the exchange rate unless the exchange 
rate is indexed to maintain purchasing power parity. 
My  quarrel with  the paper is not with its results, but with what is 
left out. The omissions might  lead a casual reader to move from the 
paper’s argument that a devaluation can reduce supply to the conclu- 
sion that devaluation is a bad way to cure a payments deficit. 
Drawing such a conclusion from the paper would reflect a common 
error in  analyzing a devaluation based on its effect on the initial level 
of output. Most analyses of devaluation  start from goods market and 
asset market (or money market) positions-output  and interest rates- 
which do not represent a sustainable macroeconomic equilibrium. An 
economy with a balance-of-payments deficit is, by definition, running 
down a quite finite stock of international reserves in order to purchase 
more goods and assets than it can pay for with its current production 
and borrowing. Because the stocks of international reserves are finite, 
the flow rates of demand for foreign goods and assets simply cannot 
be maintained.  In  particular,  the central  bank  is  suffering an unsus- 
tainable change in its portfolio, but one that is behind the scenes in the 40  Sweder van Wijnbergen 
usual  models.  Put  in  another, more  traditional  way, the underlying 
assumption regarding monetary policy often is not spelled out in models 
of devaluation;  if it were, its unsustainability would be readily apparent. 
Since an initial position with a payments deficit is unsustainable, it 
is difficult to argue that a movement away from it, toward a sustainable 
position,  is  bad. In other words, a devaluation may induce a fall in 
output in  the supply-side models because real wages fall or interest 
rates rise. But if these real wages were excessive relative to the coun- 
try’s endowments or if  interest rates were excessively  low, it would 
be hard to argue that a devaluation that corrects these excesses is bad 
policy. 
Once it  is  admitted that a balance-of-payments  deficit  cannot be 
sustained and that the economy therefore must  institute  a  different 
output-interest  rate combination, it becomes apparent that the appro- 
priate way of judging a devaluation is not where it leaves the economy 
compared to the initial unsustainable  position,  but just how  it does 
affect the economy in the transition period and how long the transition 
will  last relative to alternative policies  that would provide the same 
improvement in the balance of payments. This criterion is mentioned 
in the first paragraph of van Wijnbergen’s paper, but in fact the paper 
discusses no alternatives. I would like to attempt one such comparison 
to give some idea of the difficulties involved. 
Suppose monetary growth were allowed to  fall to correct the balance- 
of-payments deficit instead of devaluing. As I understand the model, 
this policy would move the economy back along its aggregate supply 
curve because of the implied cut in aggregate demand, as with a de- 
valuation. But a devaluation also has a relative price effect. A cut in 
monetary growth may or may not have such an effect; it would depend 
on how the increase in the central bank’s domestic credit enters the 
economy. For example, if the government had been using newly created 
money  to buy  nontraded goods, a fall  in  the rate of money growth 
would tend to lower the relative price of those goods. This might affect 
aggregate supply, although just how it would do so is difficult to say. 
Moreover, both a  devaluation  and  a  cut in  money  growth  would 
affect the rate of interest and, according to the model, shift the aggre- 
gate supply curve backward. The size of the shift might be different, 
however, because of differences in the effects of the two policies on 
expectations and interest rates. Thus, a full comparison of these two 
policies would require a more complex treatment of the determination 
of expectations and their effect on interest rates than this model contains. 
In addition, a proper comparison of the side effects of the two policies 
cannot be made until the magnitude the policies is adjusted to produce 
the same impact on the balance of payments. For example, suppose 
that a unit devaluation cuts real demand by the same amount as a unit 41  Exchange  Rate Management and Stabilization Policies 
cut in the money supply, but has larger negative effects on aggregate 
supply. Those supply effects would mean that the unit devaluation has 
a larger effect on the balance of payments than a unit cut in the money 
supply. Thus, a unit devaluation could be compared only with a larger- 
than-unit cut in the money stock. 
Finally, I would like to add that even the foregoing comparisons may 
be irrelevant from the standpoint of a policy maker. Devaluation may 
be the only alternative for resolving a typical balance-of-payments def- 
icit in a developing country; and comparisons with tighter monetary 
policy  may  not be germane given the lack of financial markets. The 
problem is simply that balance-of-payments deficits are often allowed 
to continue until the stock of international reserves becomes neglible 
and the required adjustment in the excess demand for foreign exchange 
is fairly large. As a result, it may be necessary to cut the real money 
stock to achieve the desired improvement in the balance of payments 
within the relevant time frame. Without financial markets in which to 
pursue open market operations, the best a government can achieve is 
a zero rate of domestic credit growth. This may not produce a very 
large cut in real money balances, despite the loss of international re- 
serves and the continuance of inflation. Correspondingly, the excess 
private demand for foreign exchange may not fall to a level at which 
the stock of  reserves at the beginning of the period  can  sustain the 
exchange rate for another period.  Since the rate can no longer  be 
propped up by the sale of reserves, a depreciation, through a floating 
rate, will be forced on the country. In sum, a devaluation, forced or 
not, is often the only feasible solution to a typical balance-of-payments 
deficit in an LDC. The country may simply have to accept any negative 
side effects that a devaluation may entail, because of the initial delay 
in adjustment and the lack of a full range of financial markets. This Page Intentionally Left Blank